October 6, 2023
In my Report # 291 released on September 3, 2023, I addressed some of the issues related to the U.S. nuclear weapons buildup in Europe and its willingness to deploy them in Ukraine by using U. S. dual-capable aircraft F-16. A number of readers have asked me for more information on this topic. The issue is much wider than dilemma of F-16 deliveries to Ukraine.
The United States intends to expand its nuclear presence on the European continent as a whole, in particular by additional deployment of heavy strategic bombers with nuclear weapons on board; increasing the number of dual-capable aircraft or DCA in NATO's Baltic Air Policing operation; and supplying Ukraine with fighter jets certified to deliver F-16 nuclear weapons
Therefore, the following analysis has three respective parts: deployment of the U.S. strategic nuclear forces in Europe, implementation of NATO’s “Baltic Air Policing” in the Baltic Sea area, and negative consequences of the potential delivery of F-16 DCA to Ukraine. The response will be given to a logical question: “Will all these factors increase the security on European continent and in Ukraine in particular?”
1. The first nuclear strike in Europe: strategic means for delivery
In October 2022 President Joseph Biden released its updated nuclear strategy called National Posture Review or NPR in short. His NPR is not less aggressive than Donald Trump’s similar document, as one U.S. study claimed.
The 2022 U.S. nuclear strategy clearly stated that its nuclear weapons will remain in the U.S. military capability for an indefinite period of time in the future
Its nuclear weapons will constitute an important element of a combined and broader triad than nuclear, which includes three operationally linked components: nuclear missile weapons, missile defense, and conventional forces. This is the so-called ‘Chicago Triad’ approved at the North Atlantic Alliance Summit in Chicago in May 2012. The term is unofficial, this is the term proposed and used by by the author. It is not incorporated in American official documents or research papers. But it makes sense to use it. Especially since this triple mixture of strategic and tactical tools of modern warfare has been repeated by all subsequent summits of that military alliance.
The 2022 U.S. Nuclear Strategy drew attention to the possibility of escalating combat operations conducted without the use of nuclear weapons into military operations that will be conducted with the use of nuclear weapons. It should be recalled that in recent years, the U.S. Armed Forces have arranged large-scale conventional military exercises that usually ended by delivering dummy nuclear strikes, especially very close to the borders of the Russian Federation, to the territory of Russia’s allies and friends.
The U.S. NPR of 2022 recorded a willingness to extend the employment of nuclear weapons, which have not been used in many decades since the U.S. atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. To be fair, after these two tragic dates the United States intended to use its nuclear weapons in three regional conflicts (Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq), as well as in two acute and dramatic crises erupted between the USSR and the United States/NATO (the Cuban nuclear missile crisis and the Berlin military confrontation in the 1960s). So, in total: in five cases.
In words, the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review described the guidance for of reducing the readiness level of U.S. nuclear forces. That sounded positive. But when and at what level? And what is the basis for that viewpoint? What policy initiatives and military-technical measures have been articulated? In deeds, the situation is different. Have a look at this Table borrowed from the SIPRI Yearbook released in 2023:
It shows: the USA has formidable strategic and tactical nuclear arsenal to be used in the first strike.
Three components of the U.S. strategic nuclear triad will gradually be replaced. The Joseph Biden Administration reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to the modernization of the U.S. nuclear triad and to the modernization programs for each of the components of that force structure
Between 2023 and 2027, the development of the new “Sentinel” U.S. ICBM, previously referred to in U.S. documents as a “ground-based strategic deterrent” or GBSD ICBM, will continue. It will replace the Minuteman-3 ICBMs in their entirety with the aim , that the number of Sentinel’s will remain unchanged – to have exactly 400 missiles as before. They will carry two types of warheads: “W87-0/Mk21” and “W87-0/Mk21A.” The appearance of these ICBMs will disprove the opinion of some Western and Russian experts who claim that the U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces were going to switch over to a “dyad”, meaning that they will completely eliminate ground-based intercontinental-range nuclear missiles from the traditional strategic triad. This is an incorrect judgment. So far, it has never been happened in real terms.
About the Naval component of the U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: since 2030 “Ohio”-class SSBNs will be replaced by “Columbia”-class nuclear-powered missile submarines. Their total number of them will be brought minimally to 12 vessels. They will retain their former Trident II D5 SLBMs, which will complete the second phase of their service life extension program. The “W88 Alt 370” nuclear warhead replacement program will be implemented. Some SSBNs will keep SLBMs with low-yield warheads “W76-2”. It should be recalled that according to the U.S. political and military leadership’s views, these are warheads with a yield of 5 kilotons and less.
In parallel, the United States will assist the UK in replacing the nuclear warheads on British SSBNs.
The air-based Strategic Nuclear Forces or SNF will be represented by the modernized “B-52H” heavy strategic bomber (HSB) that will remain in service until 2050, as well as the new “B-21 Raider” strategic aircraft that will replace aging “B-2A” strategic bomber. The estimated total number of “B-21” should be at least 100 aircraft. There will be a replacement of the SLCM with an extended-range nuclear missile with a “W 80-4” nuclear warhead to be mounted on such HSBs that will be in ‘stand-off position’ in designated waiting areas in Europe while to be on regular patrol.
It was recorded that the U.S. side would like to reduce the readiness of its adversaries to launch a first nuclear strike or FNS against the United States. But the White House itself has not abandoned the notion to deliver a first nuclear strike. And it does not intend to cancel such FNS formula it in the future. But at the same time, no practical initiatives have been put forward to achieve this goal.
Since 2014, USSTRATCOM has integrated bombers more prominently into EUCOM planning and activated a standing war plan for Europe for first time since the end of the Cold War
Increased deployments in Europe in the form of revival of Cold War-style long-range strike exercises and occasional port call visits by the U.S. SSBNs to the United Kingdom are taking place. In 2019 five-aircraft “B 52H” formation flew over Norway and three-aircraft “B 52H” formation crossed the sky over the Baltic region. Several “B-52” that flew from Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota conducted interoperability training with aircraft from the Baltic Air Policing mission during a long-range strategic Bomber Task Force or BTF mission throughout Europe and the Baltic region. The bombers participated in the Baltic Operations or BALTOPS maritime exercise on June 7-16, 2020. Some long-range Bomber Task Force missions to Europe that time “have sharpened the Air Force’s ability to operate in Europe and will continue”, according to Air Force General Jeff Harrigian, the commander of U.S. Air Forces in Europe-Air Forces Africa.
Two “B-2” bombers from Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri, two “B-52H” from Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota, and two “B-52H” from Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana together conducted a strategic bomber mission in Europe on May 7, 2020 according to U.S. Strategic Command. The mission, which was designed to highlight the United State “synchronized strategic deterrence,” also included Indo-Pacific Command’s zone of operations.
Additionally, some “B-1” from the 28th Bomb Wing at Ellsworth Air Force Base in South Dakota carried out a Bomber Task Force mission in Europe and the Black Sea region accompanied by Ukrainian “Su-27 Flankers” and “MiG-29” Fulcrums, and Turkish “KC-135”s for the first time ever on May 29, 2020.The coordinated events were conducted from February 3-12, 2020 and included a Bomber Task Force flight of “B-52H”. On February 3, 2020 a USAF “B-52H” bomber from Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota, rendezvoused with a “B-52H” from Anderson Air Force Base, Guam, in the vicinity of Misawa Air Base, Japan, as part of a combined BTF and Continuous Bomber Presence mission. The two bombers also conducted bilateral joint training with 13 Japan Air Self Defense Force or JASDF F-2, four F-4, and 28 F-15, and six U.S. Air Force F-16 in the vicinity of Japan before returning to Andersen AFB.
The 2022 Nuclear Strategy at the same time openly stated the need to improve the reliability of the North Atlantic Alliance’s nuclear capability, as well as to foster closer cooperation between the U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces and the nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France
The combat readiness of medium-range DCA and the possibility of using the new high-precision guided “B 61-12” air-dropped bombs in forward-deployed areas, i.e., near Russian territory have not been reduced. Moreover, the level of operational readiness of ICBMs, SSBNs, and HSBs has not radically decreased, either. This can be seen from large-scale nuclear exercises of the U.S. and NATO, regular patrols of European and Pacific airspaces by the U.S. heavy strategic bombers near the borders of Russia and China, 24-hour multinational operations of the alliance Air Force with DCA flights close to Russian borders in the framework of the NATO operation Baltic Air Policing in the skies of the three Baltic States and Poland that commenced in March 2004 where NATO DCA are involved.
NATO countries have offered 19 their military airfields to land U.S. HSBs at any time and without requesting the relevant permission from them. This factor cannot be neglected. All of them, having received their ‘permanent residence’ at military bases in the UK began practicing flights and landings at the Estonian airbase in Amari several years ago. U.S. HSBs like B-1B, B-52H and B-2A strategic bombers got the permission from London to land at the British AFBs any time.
2. NATO Air Force Operation: Baltic Air Policing
NATO’s Air Force Operation called Baltic Air Policing has been implemented during about last 20 years. It has added TNW deployment to four European NATO nations (Belgium, Germany, Italy sand the Netherlands) plus to Asian part of Turkey.
It is an extremely dangerous and destabilizing action from the point of view of Russia's national security interests. It is reminiscent of the October 1962 "Cuban Missile Crisis" initiated by Washington who initially deployed its NW in Turkey and Italy before that
The decision to conduct Baltic Air Policing Operation was made at the North Atlantic Council meeting on March 17, 2004, under the dubious pretext of "protecting the airspace of the Baltic States," as if someone had ever encroached on their airspace.
Almost two weeks later, after this decision was taken, the first NATO medium-range combat aircraft appeared on a rotational basis in the skies of the three Baltic States – Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia – who joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as full-fledged members in 2004. The duration of this operation was determined as year-round, but at first with combat aircraft flying out for a few hours a day. But then their time in the air was brought to round-the-clock. Subsequently, the airspace of Poland, which became a member of the alliance in 1999, was also included in the zone of the operation that covers the airspace of the three named U.S. satellites in the transatlantic alliance and partly the sky over the Baltic Sea.
This operation was managed by the North Atlantic Air Force Joint Operations Center located in Uedem, Germany.
Half of the 31 current Allied nations have contributed fighter and fighter-bomber aircraft of various types, refueling and reconnaissance aircraft to this NATO air operation. Combat aircraft of the Air Forces of Belgium, the UK, Denmark, France, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Turkey, Norway, the Netherlands, Spain, the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany began to take part in it on a rotational basis.
The combat aircraft of the above-mentioned alliance of the “transatlantic solidarity” actively use not only the airspace of Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Poland, but also their air bases located, respectively, in the area of Latvian Lielvarde, Lithuanian Zokniai, Estonian Amari and Polish Lodz (Lask Air Force Base). After Poland and the three Baltic States joined the alliance, all these air bases underwent thorough modernization, after which they became multifunctional. So multifunctional that they can receive all three types of heavy strategic bombers in service with the United States, namely the B-1B, B-52H and B-2A strategic bombers.
As it can be seen from this list of participating countries, all three nuclear powers of the West, i.e. the UK, the USA and France, have allocated their air units for the specific Air Forces’ exercises. They began to steadily use in it their ‘dual-purpose’ fighter-bombers capable of carrying not only conventional weapons, but also nuclear weapons in the form of free-fall bombs, which sometimes exceed the power of nuclear warheads of some United States strategic intercontinental ballistic missiles of the Minuteman-3 type.
As it was noted in a March 2019 NATO press release, U.S. strategic nuclear forces sent six long-range B-52H heavy strategic bombers to the United Kingdom at once – as it has been announced, "to conduct a series of training events over Europe." But what those ‘activities’ were became clear a little later. At the end of last year, one of the heavy strategic bombers of this type carried out a training bombing raid on a Lithuanian firing range 60 kilometers from the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad Oblast. U.S. B-52H has landed in the Check Republic in February 2022 before Russia has launched its Special Military Operation to prevent Ukrainian-NATO aggression against Russia.
Commenting on the situation with the appearance of American heavy strategic bombers in the Baltic region, a member of the Latvian Parliament tried to shift the conversation to a slightly different aspect, saying that the Pentagon is not building special storage facilities for nuclear weapons in Latvia. It may be true that it is not building any, but this does not mean that there are no nuclear weapons on board the designated delivery vehicles belonging to the United States and other NATO members. At the same time, it cannot be said that they have them on board, since the Russian Federation has never conducted any military-technical inspections in this regard and still does not arrange them, simply due to the absence of a corresponding agreement with both Washington and the capitals of all three Baltic States.
NATO continues to strengthen the Air Force formation and to expand the combat missions of the Baltic Air Policing Operation
On June 14, 2016, the then Deputy Secretary General of NATO, Alexander Vershbow, met with the defense ministers of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia to sign a new agreement on mechanisms for organizing the use of airspace in support of the NATO Air Force's air patrol mission and other airspace activities in the Baltic Sea region.
During the signing ceremony, Alexander Vershbow emphasized that this agreement between the alliance and the three Baltic States will contribute to "enhancing the ability to prepare for operations in the airspace of the Baltic Sea Region." The question arises: to prepare for what actions? The then deputy Secretary General of the transatlantic alliance also added that the signed document sends "a clear signal of the Alliance's shared responsibility and determination to defend the territory and populations of NATO countries." To defend whom?
According to the transatlantic alliance's new Joint Air Power Strategy - in the original: NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy - approved on June 26, 2018, the Air Forces of its member states should be able to operate "in any terrain and under any conditions," including in heavily defended airspace and in areas with intense air traffic. The Baltic region falls under this interpretation of air activity proposed by the bloc's headquarters. Reaffirming the readiness to continue current air operations in various regions of the world, the named document aimed the North Atlantic Alliance states at continuing the development of additional offensive Air Force doctrines and the creation of new capabilities in this area.
Official NATO strategic documents indicated that the round-the-clock defense of the airspace of the Baltic States is based on the fact that they do not have a sufficient number of combat aircraft that could undertake the designated task. However, the peculiarities of such a long operation of the NATO Air Force in the Baltic skies with the practicing of specific tactical and strategic tasks indicate that it pursues offensive combat objectives of a wide spectrum.
As announced at the NATO summit held in Brussels in July 2018, the bloc agreed on a strategy for joint air capabilities that will be a key factor for the Alliance Air Force's peacetime air patrol missions. It also applied to Baltic Air Policing Operation.
Judging by the statements of NATO's top military and political leadership made several times, all these land, sea and air-based groupings can be "reinforced" to an even greater extent if necessary. Naturally, not because of the Coronavirus.
This operation, which some Russian specialists, who are not familiar with its key functional purpose, incorrectly translate its official name from English as "Baltic Air Police Operation", is by no means formed as some kind of "police mission" to control and ensure air traffic safety in this part of the European continent. The named operation in real terms is a forward-looking air combat action with far-reaching goals.
Why is the NATO Air Force's Baltic Air Policing Operation described as extremely dangerous and destabilizing? Obviously, it is not only because its air grouping complements the several forward-deployed multinational land-based combat groupings of the North Atlantic Alliance that have been also established on the territory of the four states of the Eastern and Southern zone of the Baltic Sea mentioned earlier, as well as the naval forces of their alliance permanently stationed in the Baltic Sea.
From the point of view of Russia’s national security, another circumstance is also significant.
It is a clear nuclear factor, which is present in the named airborne operation. Especially since its ‘zone of responsibility’ covers not only the skies over the three Baltic States and Poland, but also the airspace that extends over a part of the Baltic Sea adjacent to the territory of the Kaliningrad and Leningrad Regions
NATO decided to deploy Airborne Warning and Control System or AWACS surveillance planes to Shauliai, Lithuania. The first of two aircraft arrived at the end of September 2023 and will fly missions “to monitor Russian military activity near the Alliance’s borders”, but de facto with the aim to continue Ukrainian-NATO aggression against Russia. NATO has boosted its air presence in the eastern part of the transatlantic alliance using fighter jets, surveillance planes and tankers. In September 2023 the United States deployed four additional F-16 fighter aircraft to Romania to enhance NATO’s Balkan Air Policing mission.
Calling the deployment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's nuclear-capable aircraft carriers "planned," its spokeswoman Oana Lungescu acknowledged that "it shows that the U.S. nuclear umbrella protects Europe and demonstrates the unique capabilities that the U.S. can deploy to Europe in a crisis situation." So, this is the real nuclear umbrella after all, and not some innocuous routine "Air Forces Patrol"?
Because of this potential nuclear component, such an alliance Air Force operation could well be considered a "Baltic Nuclear Crisis" or "Cuban Missile Crisis No. 3," given the actual "Cuban Missile Crisis No. 1" created by the United States in October 1962 and logically named "Cuban Missile Crisis No. 2." which was initiated by the members of the North Atlantic Alliance in December 1979, when the Alliance gave the "go-ahead" for the deployment of American nuclear ballistic missiles of the Pershing type and land-based Tomahawk cruise missiles in a number of European countries.
It seems that it is for the above-mentioned reasons that the Russian side needs to constantly raise before the United States and the other North Atlantic Treaty Organization States participating in this operation the issue of a complete cessation of the patrolling of the airspace of the Baltic States and the Baltic Sea area by NATO dual-capable combat aircraft and American heavy strategic bombers. Unfortunately, official statements by the Russian side on arms control issues hardly ever criticize this operation. Not everyone is even aware of its existence. Or they do not sufficiently realize its harmful consequences for both the regional situation and the global situation.
Raising the question from the Russian side about its complete cessation should be consistently active in any case. Such a demand should also appear as a response to the insistent statements of the United States and NATO that insist that Russia unilaterally reduce its types of weapons or reduce its military activities on its territory to zero, including in the Baltic area, particularly in the area of the Kaliningrad and Leningrad Regions.
3. Implications of F-16 DCA deliveries to Ukraine
The United States intends not only to expand its nuclear presence on the European continent, in particular by additional deployment of heavy strategic bombers with nuclear weapons on board; increasing the number of dual-capable aircraft in NATO's Baltic Air Policing operation. The USA intends to supply Ukraine with F-16 fighter jets certified to deliver nuclear weapons.
This U.S. decision potentially leads to an escalation of nuclear conflict not only in Ukraine, but also in other Eastern European countries. This is due to the fact that back in 2017 at the U.S. Air Force Base Kertland (New Mexico) it was announced that a modification of the B61 nuclear bomb was tested with an F-16 aircraft. As specified by the press service of the military facility, the test was conducted with a B61-12 warhead (without a nuclear charge), which was dropped down at the Nellis Testing Site in Nevada from an F-16 fighter-bomber. The test was conducted as part of a program to extend the B61's service life by upgrading its nuclear and non-nuclear components while improving its reliability and the robustness of its safety systems. As the base command explained, this was "the first B61-12 test utilizing the F-16".
This announcement by the U.S. Air Force was not unexpected. Moreover, it was expected. Developed in 1974 and put into service in 1978, the F-16 has F-16C, F-16D and F-16 MLO modifications that are capable of carrying nuclear weapons.
Therefore, if any of these modifications are transferred to Ukraine, it will mean that the U.S. will authorize other NATO countries (so far, the Netherlands and Denmark, but there will probably be others) to transfer tactical nuclear weapon carriers – B61-12 and B83 bombs – to Ukraine. The features of the B-61-12 bombs, as the most massively deployed in Europe, are discussed below. Regarding the B83 bombs, one should note the following: the B83 variable-power thermonuclear gravity bomb was developed by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in the late 1970s. It entered service in 1983.
With a maximum nuclear warhead yield of 1.2 megatons, the B83 is currently the most powerful U.S. nuclear weapon
This U.S. decision potentially leads to an escalation of nuclear conflict not only in Ukraine, but also in other Eastern European countries.
The combat radius of the F-16 is from 800 to 1700 km (depending on the loaded munition), and operational distance of missiles fixed from under its wing – up to 1900 km. Thus, by giving Ukraine F-16s, which are capable of delivering nuclear warheads anywhere in the European part of Russia, the USA. and NATO are deepening the implementation of the European strategy of nuclear sharing arrangements, which implies access of non-nuclear-weapon states that have F-16s in service to U.S. nuclear arsenals in Europe. With potential Ukraine’s F-16s, no one will be able to tell for sure which munition a particular crew has taken on board.
In this context Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said: "...in the course of combat operations, the Russian military will not examine whether each particular aircraft of the specified type is equipped for the delivery of nuclear weapons or not". Lavrov also noted that by transferring F-16 fighter jets to Kiev the USA and NATO are creating a threat of using nuclear weapons in Europe.
He called this an example of a very dangerous development – the appearance of these airplanes capable of carrying nuclear weapons to the Kiev regime will be seen by Russia as a threat from the West in the nuclear sphere. "We have informed the nuclear powers – the United States, Britain and France – that Russia cannot ignore the ability of these planes to carry nuclear weapons," the minister said, adding that "no assurances will help here." It should also be noted that according to many Russian and foreign experts, the transfer of F-16s to Ukraine may mean that the USA will try to find a reason to transfer tactical nuclear weapons to Ukraine as well.
Thus, the transfer of F-16s to Ukraine almost completely destroys the NPT and, accordingly, the Euro-Atlantic subsystem of global nuclear security. In addition, the increase in the number of F-35 fighter jets on the continent is a very strong indication of irresponsible U.S. activity that risks destroying the global nuclear security system by building up nuclear capabilities in Europe.
In 2021, the F-35A was certified to use the B61-12 guided nuclear bomb, which has an adjustable charge capacity (0.3; 1.5; 10 and 50 kt).
Recall that the U.S. Air Force F-35A fighters were developed in the early 2000s, the first flight took place in December 2006, serial production began in 2011, and the start of operation – in 2012. To date, more than 960 aircraft have been produced, which, in addition to the USA, have been delivered to Europe (the UK, Netherlands, Italy, Norway, Denmark, Poland, Germany), as well as to Australia, Japan, South Korea and Israel. Canada, Finland, Switzerland, Belgium, Singapore and Turkey are planning to purchase F-35s of various modifications (F-35A as ground-based fighter with conventional takeoff and landing for the Air Force; F-35B as short takeoff and vertical landing fighter; F-35C - deck fighter for the Navy). In total, it is planned to build about 3.5 thousand airplanes.
Thus, the F-35 aircraft is becoming the main fighter-bomber of NATO and U.S. allies in the Asia-Pacific region and the Middle East – that is, virtually all of our eventual adversaries, and we should be aware of the threat this aircraft poses, including for the destruction of the international global nuclear security system.
What are technical specifics of the F-35?
The F-35 aircraft has a speed of up to 1930 km/h (1.6 M), a combat radius of up to 1080 km without fuel tanks and aerial refueling, and is capable of carrying a very wide range of weapons: AIM-9, AIM-132 and AIM-120 air-to-air missiles, as well as Storm Shadow cruise missiles (already supplied to Ukraine by the UK) and AGM-158, JDAM guided bombs weighing up to 910 kg, CBU-103, CBU-104 and CBU-105 cluster bombs, AGM-154 guided aerial bombs and Brimstone anti-tank missiles (reportedly also supplied to Ukraine). Norway and Australia are funding work to adapt the advanced JSM anti-ship missile to the F-35.
According to the manufacturer, the F-35 will be able to launch these missiles and guided bombs from internal compartments at its maximum supersonic speeds.
Specifically for the F-35 fighter-bomber, the four-barrel GAU-22/A aircraft gun of 25 mm caliber was created. On the F-35A modification, the gun is installed inside the aircraft, with 180 rounds of ammunition. For modifications F-35B and F-35C developed a suspended container with a set of 220 shells, mounted under the fuselage. When creating the container used technology to reduce visibility. GAU-22/A cannons are armed with 25×137 mm FAP projectiles manufactured by Rheinmetall (Germany, planning a joint projects with Ukraine), in the U.S. Air Force are labeled PGU-48/B. The projectiles are designed to destroy ground and air targets, including armored ones. It is stated that the PGU-48/B has a tungsten core inside. The GAU-22/A has a rate of fire of up to 55 rounds per second with a muzzle velocity of over 1 km/sec. The weight of the projectile is over 200 grams.
In addition to conventional weapons, the F-35 is capable of carrying two B61 tactical nuclear bombs with a yield of 0.3 to 340 kt on internal suspension.
In the long term, the F-35A will replace the F-16 fighter as NATO's primary tactical nuclear weapons carrier.
In January 2023, a group of eight Dutch-owned F-35 fighter jets arrived in Poland to participate in two different NATO missions. At the same time, four fighters have already started patrolling NATO airspace over Eastern Europe since February 2022, and some others – since March 2023.
It should be noted that the Netherlands, a country that is ready to transfer F-16 fighters to Ukraine in the near future, regularly participates in "joint missions" where the use of nuclear weapons is practiced. This includes aircraft from so-called non-nuclear-weapon states. Aircraft involved in such missions are mandatorily equipped with equipment for the combat use of nuclear bombs. This gives grounds to say that the Dutch F-35s carry such equipment on board and are integrated into the NATO system of nuclear warfare in the European theater of combat operations.
It should be noted that one of the places where American nuclear bombs are stored in Europe is the Dutch Volkel airbase, where F-35 fighter jets are also based. And since carriers of nuclear weapons cannot be far from the stored warheads during the period of aggravation of the military and political situation, it cannot be ruled out that American thermonuclear bombs are also stored at one of the landing airfields in Poland. The most likely one is the Lask Air Force Base. Moreover, a U.S. Air Force detachment has been permanently stationed at Lask AFB since November 2012. Additional units periodically rotate to the base for exercises. These forces are believed to have nuclear capabilities and have joined nuclear exercises with NATO. Thus, F-16C/D fighter jets equipped to carry nuclear bombs have been periodically serviced at the Polish Lask AFB since 2014.
This confirms the high probability of deployed nuclear weapons at this base. It is currently the closest F-35 deployment base to Russia. It should be noted that Poland signed a contract with the United States to purchase 32 F-35A Lightning II fighter jets in January 2020. Manufacturing of the first aircraft for Poland was scheduled for 2022, Warsaw will receive the first aircraft no earlier than 2024. Earlier, a vice president of Lockheed Martin said that the Polish Air Force plans to deploy a squadron of 16 F-35A aircraft in the city of Kielcen, at the 21st Tactical Air Base Swidwin near the Baltic Sea coast. Another squadron of fighter jets will be stationed near the town of Laska in central Poland.
In addition, the F-35 fighters have now been equipped with the Valkyrie squadron, which is based at the Lakenheath AFB in the UK. It has a total of 27 F-35A Lightning II aircraft.
The number of fifth-generation fighters in Europe will increase. In September 2021, Air Force General Todd Walters, commander of the U.S. European Command and supreme commander of NATO's Combined Armed Forces in Europe, announced the plans of the alliance member states to deploy a total of 450 F-35 fighters of the national air force at 12 of their bases.
Thus, the deployment of F-35A Lightning II aircraft in Europe clearly contributes to the destruction of the international security system, including the Euro-Atlantic subsystem of the global nuclear security.
At the same time, this process poses a danger to this subsystem even if F-35A Lightning II aircraft are equipped with non-nuclear weapons, but with armor-piercing projectiles with depleted uranium (DU) rods, which, if used, will inevitably lead to the formation of radioactive contamination centers of various densities in Europe. The source of this contamination, namely DU, persists for tens of thousands of years, is carried by air and water masses, absorbed by animals together with natural fodder, etc., so the long-term consequences of the use of armor-piercing shells with DU ‘arrows’ are difficult to predict. But the risks of destroying the Euro-Atlantic global nuclear subsystem are even more aggravated by the deployment of the latest American B61-12 bombs at the U.S. bases in Europe.
What are basic features of B61-12 nuclear bomb?
The B61-12 is to replace all versions of the currently in service strategic (B61-7 and B61-10) and non-strategic (B61-3 and B61-4) B61 series bombs, except for the B61-11 anti-bunker bombs. Its mass increased to about 375 kg, while its dimensions remained the same. The B61-12 does not have a braking parachute as the previous version, but it has an inertial navigation system and a steerable tail fin in its tail section instead of fixed stabilizers. This makes the bomb steerable (a first in the U.S. nuclear bomb arsenal) and highly accurate. Its circular error probable or CEP from the target in the new bomb has decreased to about 30 meters (the current modifications have this figure is 110-170 meters). That is, the accuracy of hitting the target B61-12 increases up to six times, which is equal to the impact effect of increasing the power of the nuclear yield more than 20 times.
The B61-12 bombs use a modernized nuclear charge of the B61-4 bombs with the same power range (four – from 0.3 to 50 kt). Tests conducted without the nuclear charge showed that the bomb goes completely into the ground when dropped. This makes it suitable for destroying well-protected underground targets. The steerable tail section also offers the B61-12 some ability to glide toward to the target, which the current modifications lack, capable only of falling on a ballistic trajectory. This will allow carrier aircraft to drop the B61-12 at a greater distance from the target, thus reducing the likelihood of hitting them by missile defense.
At Pantex Plant in Texas, existing B61-3/-4/-7 and -10 nuclear bombs are converted into the B61-12 variant. The non-nuclear components of these bombs are repaired or replaced. Plutonium parts for the B61-12 are taken only from the atomic charges of the B61-4 bombs, while the thermonuclear components are to be rebuilt. In other words, it is essentially a matter of extending the life cycle of one modification, the B61-4, using selected non-nuclear components from the other three modifications (B61-3/-7 and -10) and adding a guided tail. A total of 480 old bombs are reportedly being converted into the B61-12.
The new bombs will have a service life extension program of at least 20 years, meaning they will be in service until the mid-2040s.
The B61-12 bomb can be used from the B2 strategic bomber, F-15, F-16, PA-200 Tornado fighter-bombers, as well as F-35, new B-21 Raider, F/A-18F aircraft
Overall, experts note that the B61-12 bomber ensures the combat capability of the air component of the U.S. strategic nuclear triad, as well as a future for bombers and dual-capable aircraft supporting NATO operations.
According to Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko, the modernization of the B61 bomber transforms it from a deterrent weapon into a weapon that can actually be used on the battlefield, which is a lowering of the nuclear threshold. The U.S. military naturally objects to him. As U.S. Defense Department spokesman Patrick Ryder noted: "We don't want to discuss the details of our nuclear arsenal. We have been modernizing the B61s for several years to replace the old weapons with new B61-12s. This process has nothing to do with Ukraine."
According to foreign military experts, when nuclear-carrying aircraft are relocated and nuclear bombs are delivered (conditionally) to forward-based airfields in Poland, Slovakia and the Baltic States, the entire territory of Belarus and almost the entire European part of Russia are within their range, while the flight time to the targets near the western borders is reduced about 10 times (from 40-50 to 4-7 minutes) The accuracy of bombing, taking into account the power, allows the B61-12 bombs to hit almost any target, including protected ones.
The U.S. and NATO military leadership pays special attention to the implementation of the requirements of the program for the retraining of flight crews and engineering personnel of tactical aviation squadrons of non-nuclear-weapon states of the North Atlantic Alliance (hereinafter referred to as the Retraining Program or RetrPro in order to master the B61-12 aerial bomb and its use in nuclear operations in the European theater of operations.
The goal of the RetrPro
The goal of the RetrPro is to increase the combat potential and operational and strategic capabilities of the non-nuclear-weapon Air Forces of NATO member countries, and its objectives are: increasing the general level of theoretical and practical training of flight and engineering personnel, as well as flight leadership teams formed from the Armed Forces of Poland, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and other non-nuclear-weapon states of the bloc involved in nuclear missions; strengthening the skills of the personnel of the aviation units of the armed forces of the countries that do not possess TNWs to prepare and use B61-12 nuclear bombs independently and as part of a grouping of alliance troops (forces).
The relevant facts have been published in open sources, and one can confidently assert: NATO nuclear weapons have long been placed in Poland with a high degree of probability, which is carefully concealed.
In general, the U.S. deployment of the latest fighter-bombers and nuclear bombs in Europe suggests that the F-35A/B61-12 bundle already present near our borders will significantly increase the combat capabilities of the U.S. nuclear arsenal in the region. The much more accurate guided nuclear bombs, even if less powerful than the B61-3 bombs they will replace, will actually have a more devastating effect. In addition, the low-observable fifth-generation F-35A fighters will greatly increase the likelihood of delivering these precision weapons to their targets.
It is fair to say that B61-12 bombs would increase the threat of nuclear war
A more accurate bomb with a lower yield (and also adjustable over a fairly wide range) lowers the nuclear threshold – it is usable against a wider range of targets, and policymakers and militaries can more easily decide to use it (including in the first nuclear strike) without fear of massive, indiscriminate civilian deaths (collateral damage) from the explosion and subsequent fallout. Therefore, the deployment of a significant number of modernized B61-12 bombs in Europe qualitatively increases the risks of destroying the global nuclear security system, at least its Euro-Atlantic global nuclear security subsystem.
These risks are determined not only by all the above-mentioned circumstances, but also by the fact that Russia, convinced of the futility of its attempts to keep the situation in Europe from sliding into intensified "nuclearization," has taken decisive actions to strengthen its security in recent years.
NATO nuclear storage facilities’ improvement
Realizing this, the U.S. and other NATO countries that host U.S. nuclear weapons are taking enhanced measures to improve their physical security. In particular, they are actively restoring and modernizing their nuclear ammunition storage facilities, which were built during the Cold War and have been mothballed since the late 1990s and early 2000s. At that time, nuclear warheads were stored at storage sites divided into three echelons: storage sites of type "A", "F", "C", "B"; supply sites of type "S"; and storage sites of type "Z";
Storage, supply, and storage sites designed for peacetime storage of nuclear ammunition are stationary complexes of special underground and semi-underground storage facilities, technical buildings, workshops, laboratories, administrative buildings, and other structures.
The area of a nuclear ammunition depot can be up to 12 km2. The storage facilities are buried in the ground up to 5 m, 25-40 m long, 15-20 m wide, and 3-4 m high at the entrance. On the territory of the warehouse the storages are located at a distance of 30-60 m from each other. In front of each storage facility, an earthen protective rampart up to 15 m high is built at a small distance. To protect against lightning strikes, lightning rods are installed on the storages. The walls of the storages are reinforced concrete, up to one m thick. Their two entrances are closed by iron gates with electronic security locks.
The nuclear ammunition depot had a complex and carefully organized system of security and defense.
At 900 to 1,500 meters from the fence of the depot there were external security units located in prepared positions. The nuclear ammunition storage site had several restricted areas (restricted zone, restricted movement zone, and highly restricted zone) to which access was strictly limited. Patrols and fixed posts posted near the facilities and on guard towers were equipped with radios to maintain communication with the main checkpoint. Ground target detection radars and control systems, all kinds of signaling sensors, communication and warning equipment were used as technical means of early warning.
These storage sites seemed to have served their purpose, but according to U.S. defense budget documents, modernization has begun so that they can be used again to store U.S. nuclear weapons after decades of downtime. The Biden administration’s FY 2023 defense budget request included data on infrastructure investments in nuclear weapons storage sites in Belgium, the UK, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey. Hundreds of millions of dollars are requested for this, although even now in Europe, B61 bombs are stored in fairly secure underground vaults of the WS3 system (Weapons Storage and Security System, consisting of a weapons storage facility, and electronic monitoring and control systems) under the floor of highly secure aircraft shelters. Each vault can accommodate up to four B61 nuclear bombs directly underneath the carrier aircraft.
However, the already mentioned FY 2023 budget request to the U.S. Congress states that they NATO is "completing a $384 million infrastructure investment program at depots in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Turkey to upgrade security measures, communications systems, and facilities."
The Federation of American Scientists believes that, for example, the UK facility being upgraded is the U.S. airbase at Lakenheath, a hundred kilometers northeast of London. This base had 33 underground vaults that held 110 B61 bombs. The U.S. military withdrew its B61 warheads of earlier design from Lakenheath more than 15 years ago, marking the end of more than half a century of maintaining a U.S. nuclear arsenal in the UK. Since their withdrawal, the storage facilities have been mothballed. At the time of their withdrawal, these gravity bombs were considered militarily obsolete, and the international community had high hopes for further disarmament of the nuclear powers.
However, as already mentioned, as part of the Pentagon's new military preparations, the B61 has been given a new lease on life and requires reliable storage facilities.
Russian and foreign experts believe that the modernization of nuclear warhead storage facilities is a sign that the United States and NATO are preparing for a prolonged and possibly intensified confrontation with Russia
The NATO military has a false sense that the modernized storage facilities will make nuclear warheads invulnerable to Russia, because if they were built to withstand a Soviet nuclear strike with warheads of a few megatons of TNT, they will be able to withstand a modern Russian nuclear attack with warheads of hundreds of kilotons very effectively. However, these are profoundly erroneous notions. As the President of Russia Vladimir Putin noted in his address of February 24, 2022, modern Russia, even after the collapse of the USSR and the loss of a significant part of its potential, today is one of the most powerful nuclear powers in the world and, moreover, has certain advantages in a number of the latest types of weapons. In this regard, no one should have any doubts that a direct attack on Russia would lead to defeat and terrible consequences for any potential aggressor. That is, the placement of nuclear weapons in modernized storage facilities will only provoke Moscow to use the most powerful and advanced weapons against them, which will cause unpredictable consequences.
Thus, the modernization of nuclear weapons storage facilities in the European region will not secure these weapons, but, on the contrary, will cause a prompt and strong reaction from Russia.
Thus, the destructive policy of the United States, NATO and some of their satellites in the field of European security leads to the formation of new threats, inevitably leads to the erosion of strategic stability and increases the likelihood of combat or terrorist use of nuclear weapons, primarily against Russia
All this unambiguously leads to the disruption or even destruction of the Euro-Atlantic subsystem of global nuclear security. However, as a comprehensive analysis shows, this policy is characteristic of the United States not only in Europe, but also in other regions of the world. At the same time, the most dangerous and acute situation with global nuclear security threats and risks is in the Asia-Pacific region, since it is there that another node of tension has formed – between the United States, the PRC, North and South Korea, and others. This also directly affects the state of the Asia-Pacific subsystem of global nuclear security, the risks of destruction of which were presented.
Final brush
“As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance”. It has been once again stated in the Vilnius NATO Summit Communiqué in July 2023 (item 43) “As long as nuclear weapons exist…“? Can someone find any NATO commitments to downsize U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe? No, not yet since mid-50s when the U.S.TNW have been brought to the European continent. However, the reality is that NATO's nuclear burden-sharing arrangements and continues U.S. deployment of NW in Europe have always been in full violation of the NPT and the basic principles of the European security.
The same mood is incorporated in item 44 of the Vilnius Communique: “NATO’s nuclear deterrence posture also relies on the United States’ nuclear weapons forward-deployed in Europe. National contributions, by Allies concerned, of dual-capable aircraft, as well as the provision of conventional forces and military capabilities in support of NATO’s nuclear deterrence mission, remain central to this effort”.
In item 45 NATO confirmed that it will take all necessary steps to ensure the credibility, effectiveness, safety and security of the nuclear deterrent mission. This includes continuing to modernize NATO’s nuclear capability and updating planning to increase flexibility and adaptability of the alliance’s nuclear forces. The alliance reaffirmed the imperative to ensure the broadest possible participation by allies concerned in NATO’s nuclear burden-sharing arrangements to demonstrate Alliance unity and resolve.
To cut a long story short: the USA and NATO as a military block have firm intention to convert Europe and Ukraine into a nuclear powder keg.
Ukrainian factor created by Washington and its allies is additional pretext in reaching such dangerous Armageddonish-type goal.
Written by Vladimir P. Kozin
